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Abstract
The tax depreciation decision potentially has signiﬁcant impact on the prof-
itability of ﬁrms and projects. Indeed, the depreciation method chosen for tax
purposes aﬀects the timing of tax payments, and, as a consequence, it also aﬀects
the after-tax net present value of investment projects. Previous research focusses
on the optimal choice of depreciation method under the assumption that the de-
preciation method has to be set ex ante and cannot be changed during the useful
life of the asset. In reality however, changes are allowed under certain circum-
stances. This paper develops a dynamic programming approach to determine the
ﬁrm’s optimal choice with regard to the initial depreciation method, and whether
changes of method are proposed in later periods.
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11 Introduction
In order to determine a ﬁrm’s taxable income, cash ﬂows are reduced with depreciation
charges that reﬂect the decrease in economic value of the ﬁrm’s assets. For practical
purposes, a number of standardized depreciation methods have been designed, and ﬁrms
can choose a method from this set. Typically, tax authorities allow ﬁrms to choose
between the straight line depreciation method, which divides the asset value equally
over the useful life of the asset, and a speciﬁed accelerated method, which assigns higher
depreciation charges to earlier periods. The choice of depreciation method potentially
has important consequences. Indeed, since the depreciation method aﬀects the timing of
tax payments, it aﬀects the net present value of the ﬁrm’s after-tax revenues. Existing
literature shows that tax depreciation can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm and its
investment behavior (see, e.g., Sansing, 1998, De Waegenaere et al., 2003, Wielhouwer
et al., 2000, and Arkin and Slastnikov, 2007).
The focus in our paper is on the choice of depreciation strategy that minimizes the
expected present value of tax payments. The early literature on optimal tax depreciation
(e.g., Davidson and Drake, 1961, 1964, Roemich et al., 1978, and Wakeman, 1980)
assumes that the cash ﬂow in every future period is high enough to cover the highest
possible depreciation charge in that period. Then, it is optimal to choose the most
accelerated depreciation method. The reason is that due to the time value of money,
a dollar of tax paid this year decreases ﬁrm value to a larger extent than a dollar of
tax paid in a later year. Therefore, it is optimal to depreciate as much as possible as
early as possible, but never more than the cash ﬂow in the corresponding period. More
recent literature extends the early work by allowing for uncertain future cash ﬂows,
reinvestments, and/or progressive tax structures (Berg and Moore 1989, Berg et al.
2001, De Waegenaere and Wielhouwer 2002, and Wielhouwer et al., 2002), and shows
that it is no longer necessarily the case that the most accelerated method is preferred.
The above described literature assumes that the depreciation method has to be
set ex ante and cannot be changed during the lifetime of the asset. However, ﬁrms
typically have the option to request a change of method (see, e.g., the US Department
of Treasury, 2008). It is intuitively clear that the option to change method can reduce
the expected net present value (NPV) of tax payments signiﬁcantly. Ignoring the option
2value might imply that the ﬁrm foregoes positive NPV investment projects. Our goal
in this paper is therefore to determine the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy with regard to the
choice of depreciation method in the year of acquisition of an asset, and whether or not
a change of method is proposed in later years. Since ﬁrms needs to have an accurate
motivation for a proposed change, we consider a model where proposing and negotiating
a change is costly, and there exists a positive probability that the tax authority will not
accept the proposal. We allow this probability to depend on whether changes were
proposed in earlier periods, and whether they were accepted.
We formulate the ﬁrm’s decision problem as a dynamic optimization problem, and
determine recursive relationships for the corresponding value functions. Then, we use
these recursive relationships to investigate the eﬀect of discounting (i.e., the time value
of money) on the optimal depreciation strategy. We show that the key result in the static
setting, which states that stronger discounting (i.e. a lower discount factor) works in
favor of more accelerated methods (see, e.g., Berg et al., 2001), does not extend to the
dynamic setting. Speciﬁcally, we identify settings where the opposite holds, in the sense
that switching to a more accelerated method is preferred only if the discount factor
is suﬃciently high. Finally, in a numerical analysis we show that the option to change
method can reduce expected discounted tax payments signiﬁcantly, and that the value of
the option depends crucially on how the probability that proposed changes are accepted
depends on whether prior changes were proposed and/or accepted.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the optimiza-
tion problem. Section 3 reformulates the problem as a dynamic optimization problem.
Section 4 deals with the eﬀect of discounting on the optimal solution. Section 5 gives a
numerical analysis. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 The model
A ﬁrm has an asset of value D at time 0, which can be depreciated for tax purposes
over a maximum of N periods. The depreciation charge in period i reﬂects the reported
decrease in value of the asset during that period. We formally distinguish a depreciation
method and a depreciation scheme.
3Deﬁnition 1
• A depreciation scheme for an asset of value D consists of a vector d = (d1,    ,dN) ∈
RN
+ for some N that satisﬁes
N  
i=1
di = D. (1)




fM(i,N) = 1, for all N. (2)
When depreciation method M is used throughout the depreciable life of an asset
with initial value D, the corresponding depreciation scheme is given by
di = fM(i,N)   D, for all i = 1,    ,N.
An example of a commonly used depreciation method is the straight line depreciation
method (SDM), which divides the depreciation charges equally over the depreciable life
of the asset, i.e.
fSDM(i,N) =
1
N, for i = 1,...,N. (3)
In contrast, the sum of the years’ digits method (SYD) is an accelerated method in the
sense that the depreciation charges decrease over time. Speciﬁcally,
fSY D(i,N) =
2(N−i+1)
N(N+1) , for i = 1,...,N. (4)














 N−1 , for i = N.
(5)
The choice of depreciation scheme potentially has important consequences for tax pay-
ments. Indeed, taxable income equals cash ﬂow minus depreciation charges. If the cash
4ﬂow in a given year exceeds the depreciation charge for that year, so that taxable income
is positive, then taxes are paid on the diﬀerence between the cash ﬂow and the depre-
ciation charge. If the cash ﬂow is lower than the depreciation charge, taxable income
is negative, and no taxes are paid.1 This implies that the expected present value of all










where Ci denotes the random cash ﬂow in year i, di denotes the depreciation charge in
year i, (Ci − di)+ = max{Ci − di,0}, τ ∈ (0,1] denotes the tax rate, and α(i) denotes
the present value of one unit to be paid i years from now.
The existing literature focuses on the choice of depreciation method that minimizes (6)
over a given set of acceptable depreciation methods, under the assumption that the
depreciation method is chosen at date zero, and never changed afterwards. As stated
in the introduction, however, ﬁrms typically have the possibility to propose a change
of depreciation method in later periods. This implies that, in addition to choosing the
initial depreciation method, the ﬁrm has to decide whether or not a change is proposed
at the beginning of periods i = 2,...,N. Our goal in this paper is to determine the
ﬁrm’s optimal strategy with regard to the choice of depreciation method, and whether or
not changes are proposed. According to common practice, we consider a setting where
there are two acceptable depreciation methods, A and B, e.g. an accelerated method
and the straight line method, and we use the following notation:
Mc = B, if M = A,
= A, if M = B.
With two methods and a possible change in each period, there are at most 2N−1 possible
depreciation schemes. When there is no uncertainty regarding whether a proposal to
change will be accepted, the ﬁrm’s decision problem amounts to choosing the depreci-
ation method that minimizes (6) among a subset of these 2N−1 depreciation schemes.
1We abstract from carry over possibilities (compensating taxable proﬁts with losses in earlier years,
or losses with proﬁts in earlier years). Earlier research (see e.g. Berg et al. 2001) shows that carry over
possibilities do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the qualitative results.
5The subset is determined by the tax authority’s policy with regard to acceptance of
changes. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2 Suppose that the tax authority accepts the ﬁrst proposal to change method,
and rejects all subsequent proposals. Then, there are 2N possible depreciation schemes,
resulting from using depreciation method M ∈ {A,B} in periods i = 1,    ,k, and
method Mc in periods i = k + 1,    ,N, for k = 1,    ,N. The corresponding deprecia-
tion charges are given by:
di = fM(i,N)D0, i = 1,    ,k,
= fMc(i − k,N − k)Dk, i = k + 1,    ,N,
where D0 denotes the initial asset value, and Dk denotes the residual tax base at the
start of period k +1, i.e. the initial asset value reduced with prior depreciation charges.
In this paper, however, we consider a setting where there is uncertainty as to whether a
proposal will be accepted. The probability that a proposal to change will be accepted in
a given period may depend on whether changes were proposed in prior periods and/or
whether they were accepted. This implies that the ﬁrm optimally conditions it’s decision
to propose a change on whether or not changes were proposed in prior periods and
whether they were accepted. In addition, since the tax authority requires detailed
motivation, proposing changes is costly. The objective of the ﬁrm then is to minimize
the sum of the expected discounted tax payments and the expected cost of proposing
and negotiating changes through the following decision variables:
(i) the choice of the initial depreciation method M, and
(ii) the choice whether or not to propose a change in period i, depending on whether
or not changes were proposed in prior periods and whether they were accepted.
Now let for any given period i, a decision node j represent one possible scenario with
respect to whether changes were proposed in prior periods, and whether they were
accepted. Since either no change is proposed, a change is proposed but not accepted,
or a change is proposed and accepted, there are 3i−2 decision nodes in period i. We
therefore introduce the decision variables:
M ∈ {A,B} = the initial depreciation method,
6and, for every i = 2,    ,N, and j = 1,    ,3i−2,
ξi,j = 0, if no change is proposed in period i, decision node j;
= 1, if a change is proposed in period i, decision node j,
(7)
and the random variables:
φi,j = 0, if ξi,j = 0;
= 0, if ξi,j = 1, and the proposed change is rejected;
= 1, if ξi,j = 1, and the proposed change is accepted.
(8)
We are now ready to formulate the optimization problem. First, it is clear that if the
ﬁrm’s decision in period i depends on whether changes were proposed and/or accepted
in prior periods, uncertainty regarding acceptance of proposals implies that the depre-
ciation charge that will be applied in a given period, as well as whether a change will
be proposed, are random variables that depend on the initial choice M and the change
strategy ξ. Speciﬁcally, for any given (M,ξ), we denote
• di(M,ξ) for the random variable that yields the depreciation charge in period i,
for i = 1,    ,N;
• ξi(M,ξ) for the random variable that equals 1 if a change is proposed at the
beginning of period i, and 0 otherwise, for i = 2,    ,N.
Now, let k denote the cost of proposing a change. Then, the amount of tax to be paid at
the end of period i equals τ(Ci − di(M,ξ))+, and the cost of proposing a change at the
beginning of period i is given by k if ξi(M,ξ) = 1, and 0 otherwise. The optimal initial















, for i = 2,    ,N.
(9)
It is clear that the optimal strategy depends on k and τ only through κ = k/τ. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we let τ = 1.
7In order to solve the optimization problem, the probability distribution of di(M,ξ)
for i = 1,    ,N as well as the probability distribution of ξi(M,ξ) for i = 2,    ,N,
need to be determined for any given change strategy ξ, and any initial method M.
These probability distributions clearly depend on how the probability of acceptance of a
proposal depends on whether proposals were made in earlier periods, and whether they
were accepted.
The following proposition considers the case where at most one proposal will be
accepted. First, we introduce some notation. Without loss of generality, we let decision
node (i,1) represent the unique node in period i in which no changes were proposed
in prior periods. Moreover, let d(M,k), k = 1,    ,N, represent the depreciation scheme
that results from using method M ∈ {A,B} in periods i = 1,    ,k, and using method
Mc in periods k + 1,    ,N.
Proposition 3 Consider a setting where, as long as no prior proposal has been accepted,
the probability that a proposal will be accepted is constant and equal to p. As soon as a
prior proposal has been accepted, all future proposals will be rejected. Then, under the
optimal strategy, the probability distribution of the resulting depreciation scheme is given
by:
P(d(M,ξ) = d(M,k)) = ξk+1,1   p   (1 − p)
 k
j=2 ξj,1, k = 1,    ,N − 1,
= (1 − p)
 N
j=2 ξj,1, k = N,
(10)
and the probability that a change is proposed at the beginning of period i is given by:
P(ξi(M,ξ) = 1) = ξi,1   (1 − p)
 i−1
j=2 ξj,1. (11)
The above proposition shows that in the case where the probability of acceptance is
constant as long as no prior change has been accepted, and drops to zero as soon as
a change has been accepted, the number of decision variables in optimization problem
(6) reduces from 1 +
N  
i=2
3i−2 to N. The ﬁrm’s optimal strategy can then be found by
plugging in (10) and (11) in the objective function of optimization problem (9), and
determining the optimal value over all M ∈ {A,B}, and ξi,1 ∈ {0,1} for i = 2,    ,N.
We illustrate this in the following example.
8Example 4 Consider an asset with a depreciable lifetime of 5 years, i.e. N = 5, and
an initial value of D0 = 5. The ﬁrm initially has the option to choose either the Straight
line Depreciation Method (SDM), or the Sum of the Years Digits method (SYD), and
can propose a change of method in later periods. As long as no prior proposal has been
accepted, the probability that a proposal will be accepted is constant and equal to p = 0.9.
As soon as a prior proposal has been accepted, all future proposals will be rejected. The

























Figure 1: Decision tree. In every decision node, the upper (lower) arrow corresponds to
the use of SDM (SYD); a straight arrow indicates that a change is no longer possible.
In each node, the optimal (suboptimal) choice is indicated with a solid (dotted) arrow.
The optimal trajectory is indicated with bold arrows. The values at the nodes indicate
the residual tax base in that node.
The only possible depreciation schemes are d(M,k), for M ∈ {SDM,SY D} and k =
1,    ,N, with depreciation charges given by:
d(M,k),i = fM(i,5)   5, i = 1,    ,k,






, i = k + 1,    ,5.
Now, we let α(i) = αi with α = 0.95, and κ = k/τ = 0.01. The cash ﬂow in period
i = 1,    ,5 is normally distributed with mean µi and standard deviation σi as given in
9the following table:
period i 1 2 3 4 5
µi 1.5 1 2 3 0.5
σi 1 2 2 2 3
Without the possibility to change depreciation method, the expected discounted tax pay-
ments using SDM and SYD are 5.36 and 5.34, respectively, so that SYD is the preferable
method. Allowing for the possibility to change, however, implies that it is optimal to start
with SDM, and propose a change of method in period 4. This strategy reduces the ex-
pected tax costs (tax payments plus costs of proposing changes) to 5.26. The possibility
to change depreciation method therefore reduces expected tax costs by 1.5%. ⋄
In the setting described in Proposition 3, it is possible to determine the probability
distribution of the depreciation charges in each period for any given strategy. In more
general cases, however, this becomes complicated. Then, an eﬃcient method to solve
optimization problem (9) is dynamic programming. In the next section, we therefore
develop a dynamic optimization approach to determine the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy.
3 Dynamic optimization
The basic idea of the dynamic optimization approach is to recursively determine the
value function in period i, for i = N,N−1,    ,1. This value function yields the minimal
expected present value of the sum of tax payments and costs of proposing changes in
periods i,    ,N, for any possible value of the state variables at the beginning of period
i. Given the analysis in the previous section, we let the state variables in period i be
given by si = (M1,ξi−1,φi−1), where:
• M1 ∈ {A,B} denotes the method that is used in period 1;
• ξi−1 = (ξ1,    ,ξi−1) ∈ {0,1}i−1 denotes whether a change was proposed at the
beginning of periods j = 1,    ,i − 1;
• φi−1 = (φ1,    ,φi−1) ∈ {0,1}i−1 denotes whether a change was accepted in periods
j = 1,    ,i − 1.
10In order to determine the optimal decision at the start of period i for any given value
of si, the following has to be known:
- the expected tax payments in period i, as a function of si and the decision at the
beginning of period i;
- the probability distribution of si+1, as a function of si and the decision at the
beginning of period i.
It therefore remains to: i) specify the probability distribution of the state variables,
and, ii) show that (M1,ξi−1,φi−1) is suﬃcient to determine the expected tax payments
in period i. This will be dealt with in subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Subsection
3.3 presents the recursive evaluation of the value functions.
3.1 Probability distribution of state variables
In period i = 1, there is no proposal to change, and so ξ1 = φ1 = 0. Therefore, s2 =
(M1,0,0) with probability 1. For periods i = 2,    ,N, we let:
pi(ξi−1,φi−1) = P(φi = 1|ξi = 1;ξ2,...,ξi−1;φ2,...,φi−1),
denote the probability that a proposed change will be accepted at the beginning of
period i, as a function of whether or not changes were proposed in periods prior to
period i (i.e. ξ2,...,ξi−1), and whether or not they were accepted (i.e. φ2,...,φi−1).
Now let the state variables at the beginning of period i be given by si = (M1,ξi−1,φi−1).
Then, the probability distribution of the state variables in period i + 1 depends on
whether a change is proposed at the beginning of period i. Speciﬁcally,
• when no change is proposed, ξi = φi = 0, and so si+1 = (M1,(ξi−1,0),(φi−1,0))
with probability 1;
• when a change is proposed, ξi = 1, and with probability pi(ξi−1,φi−1) it is ac-
cepted (φi = 1), so that si+1 = (M1,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,1)). With probability (1 −
pi(ξi−1,φi−1)) it is not accepted (φi = 0), so that si+1 = (M1,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,0)).
113.2 Expected tax payments
The following lemma shows that the depreciation charge to be used in period i when
method M is used in that period depends only on: the period i, the residual tax base at
the beginning of period i, and the last period before period i in which method M was
not used.
Lemma 5 Suppose method M is used in periods k = j,    ,i−1, method Mc is used in
period j −1, and the residual tax base at the beginning of period i equals D. Then, there
exists a qi,j,N ∈ [0,1] such that the depreciation charge to be used in period i if method
M is used is given by:
di =
fM(i − j + 1,N − j + 1)
1 −
 i−j
k=1 fM(k,N − j + 1)
D
= qi,j,N   D.
Moreover, qN,·,N = 1.
The above lemma shows that, for any given depreciation method, the fraction of the
residual tax base to be depreciated in period i is a function of the current period i, the
useful life of the asset N, and the last period before period i in which the method was
not used ( j −1). For example, it is easily veriﬁed that in case of SDM, SYD and DDB,
as deﬁned in (3), (4), and (5), respectively, the fractions qi,j,N are given by:
qi,j,N,SDM = 1
N+1−i, for i = 1,...,N,
qi,j,N,SYD = 2
N+2−i, for i = 1,...,N,
qi,j,N,DDB =
2
N−j+1, for i = 1,...,N − 1,
= 1, for i = N.
(12)
Note that in case of SDM and SYD, qi,j,N is independent of j. For notational convenience,
we restrict to depreciation methods for which the fraction of the residual tax base to
be depreciated in a given period i is independent of j.2 Moreover, since the maximum
depreciable lifetime of the asset N is given and ﬁxed, we omit the index N, and we
denote qi,M := qi,·,N for the fraction of the residual tax base to be depreciated in period
i if method M is used. This yields the following lemma.
2Allowing the fractions to depend on j increases notational complexity, but it does not otherwise
aﬀect the results.
12Lemma 6 The expected tax to be paid in period i if the residual tax base at the beginning





where Fi( ) denotes the distribution function of the cash ﬂow in period i.
It now remains to show that (M1,ξi−1,φi−1) is suﬃcient to determine the expected tax
payments in period i for any possible decision. First, since a change of method only
occurs when ξi = 1 and φi = 1, it follows immediately that the method Mi used in
period i is determined recursively as follows:
Mj = Mc
j−1, if ξj = 1 and φj = 1,
= Mj−1, otherwise,
(13)
and, given Lemma 5, it follows that the residual tax base Di−1 at the beginning of period
i is determined recursively by:
Dj = (1 − qj,A)   Dj−1, if Mj = A,
= (1 − qj,B)   Dj−1, if Mj = B,
(14)
where D0 denotes the initial asset value.
Now let (M1,ξi−1,φi−1) be a decision node in period i. Then,
• if no change is proposed at the beginning of period i, the expected tax payments
in period i are given by Tax(i,Mi−1,Di−1);
• if a change is proposed at the beginning of period i, then the expected tax payments
in period i are given by pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   Tax(i,Mc
i−1,Di−1) + (1 − pi(ξi−1,φi−1))  
Tax(i,Mi−1,Di−1).
Therefore, expected tax payments in period i can be determined from (M1,ξi−1,φi−1),
where Mi−1 and Di−1 follow from (13) and (14).
133.3 Recursive evaluation
While (M1,ξi−1,φi−1) yields suﬃcient information to determine the optimal decision in
period i, it follows from Lemma 6, (13) and (14), that it is convenient to use the following,
equivalent, set of state variables (M,D,ξi−1,φi−1), where M denotes the method that
was used in period i−1, and D denotes the residual tax base at the end of period i−1.
We now deﬁne the value functions as follows. The function
Vi(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1) : {A,B} × R × {0,1}
i−1 × {0,1}
i−1 → R,
for i = 2,    ,N, yields the minimal expected value of the sum of the costs of propos-
ing changes and the present value of future tax payments for periods i,    ,N, given
(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1). The function
V1(D) : R → R,
yields the minimal expected value of the sum of the costs of proposing changes and the
present value of future tax payments for all periods, as a function of the initial value of





denotes the value at date i − 1 of one unit at date i.
Proposition 7 Let :
VN+1( , , , ) := 0.






Tax(i,M,D) + αi   Vi+1(M,(1 − qi,M)D,(ξi−1,0),(φi−1,0)),
κ + pi(ξi−1,φi−1)  
 
Tax(i,Mc,D) + αi   Vi+1(Mc,(1 − qi,Mc)D,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,1))
 
+(1 − pi(ξi−1,φi−1))  
 









{Tax(1,M,D) + α1   V2(M,(1 − q1,M)D,0,0)}.
14Note that the choice of ξi not only aﬀects the depreciation method and the residual tax
base in the next period, but also the probability that a future change will be accepted.
When no change is proposed in period i, the probability of acceptance in the next period
is given by pi+1((ξi−1,0),(φi−1,0)); when a change is proposed and accepted, it is given
by pi+1((ξi−1,1),(φi−1,1)); when a change is proposed but not accepted, it is given by
pi+1((ξi−1,1),(φi−1,0)).
The following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 7.
Corollary 8 It holds that:
i) It is optimal to choose method M in period 1 iﬀ
Tax(1,M,D) + α1   V2(M,(1 − q1,M)D,0,0)
≤ Tax(1,M
c,D) + α1   V2(M
c,(1 − q1,Mc)D,0,0). (15)
ii) In periods i = 2,...,N, a change should be proposed iﬀ




−pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   Vi+1(M
c,(1 − qi,Mc)D,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,1))
−(1 − pi(ξi−1,φi−1))   Vi+1(M,(1 − qi,M)D,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,0)).
(16)
The above proposition shows that it is optimal to propose a change in period i iﬀ
the costs of the proposal are lower than the expected beneﬁt from the proposal. This
expected beneﬁt consists of two parts: i) the expected reduction in tax payments in
period i, which is equal to pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)], and ii) the
present value of the expected reduction in tax payments in all future periods, which is
given by αi   Si+1(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1). It is clear that the discount factor αi can play a
crucial role in whether or not it is optimal to propose a change. In the next section, we
investigate the eﬀect of discounting on the optimal decision in each period.
154 Eﬀect of discounting
Berg et al. (2001) consider the case where α(i) = αi, for all i (i.e., a ﬂat term structure
of interest rates), and where a change of method is never allowed. They then show that
less discounting (a higher value of α) works in favor of the least accelerated method. In
our setting, however, a decision has to be made in every period. We allow the discount
factor to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent periods, i.e. α(i) = α1   α2         αi  = αi, and consider
a method to be more accelerated in period i if the depreciation charge in that period
exceeds the depreciation charge of the alternative method.
It can be veriﬁed easily that for the ﬁrst period decision, as in Berg et al. (2001),
there exists a critical value of the ﬁrst period discount factor   α1 such that the most
(least) accelerated method is optimal if α1 <   α1 (α1 >   α1). This, however, is not
necessarily the case for later periods.We ﬁrst show that the decision whether or not to
propose a change in the last period is independent of discount factors.
Proposition 9 It is never optimal to propose a change of method in period N.
Next, the following proposition shows that, in contrast to Berg et al. (2001), it is possible
that a higher discount rate works in favor of the more accelerated method.
Proposition 10 For any given period i ∈ {2,    ,N −1}, and state (M, D, ξi−1,φi−1),
the following holds:
i) If qi,M > qi,Mc or κ ≤ pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)], then there
exists a critical value ˜ αi ≤ 1 such that the most (least) accelerated method in period
i is preferable if αi < ˜ αi (αi > ˜ αi),
ii) If qi,M < qi,Mc and κ > pi(ξi−1,φi−1) [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)], there exists
a critical value ˜ αi ≤ 1 such that the most (least) accelerated method in period i is
preferable if αi > ˜ αi (αi < ˜ αi).
The intuition that more discounting works in favor of more accelerated methods is
that these methods typically lower taxable income in earlier periods. Proposition
10, however, shows that higher values of αi can make it optimal for ﬁrms to change
16to the more accelerated method in cases where costs are relatively high. The in-
tuition is as follows. Suppose the ﬁrm used the least accelerated method in period
i − 1 (possibly due to refusal of earlier proposals to change). Suppose furthermore
that κ > pi(ξi−1,φi−1)[Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)], and Si+1(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1) > 0.
Then, the expected beneﬁt in the current period of changing to the more accelerated
method is negative, because the expected reduction in tax payments (pi(ξi−1,φi−1)  
[Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)]) is lower than the cost κ of proposing the change. How-
ever, since Si+1(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1) > 0, the expected beneﬁt in future periods from chang-
ing to the more accelerated method is positive. Now, it is only worth the relatively
large cost of proposing a change (κ) if the potential beneﬁts of using the more acceler-
ated method in later periods are suﬃciently high to compensate the loss in the current
period. When the discount factor is low (low αi), the ﬁrm prefers not to have high
costs now since the beneﬁt in future periods is discounted heavily. If αi is suﬃciently
high, however, the expected gain in future periods can dominate the expected cost in
the current period. A higher discount factor can then make it optimal for the ﬁrm to
propose a change to the more accelerated method.
5 Numerical illustration
In this section we illustrate the eﬀect of the cost κ and the probability structure pi( , ) on
the optimal strategy in a numerical example. Speciﬁcally, we consider a setting where:
• The acceptable depreciation methods are SDM and SY D, as deﬁned in (12).
• N = 10, and the initial amount to depreciate equals D0 = 10.
• Cash ﬂows are normally distributed. The means and standard deviations of the
cash ﬂow distributions are given in the following table:
period i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E[Ci] 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 0 2
σ[Ci] 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
This reﬂects a setting where the variance is constant over the periods, but expected
income generated by the asset grows in early periods, and starts to decrease as of
17period 8. The expected revenue in the last period includes the salvage value of the
asset.
• αi = α = 0.95 for all i, so that the present value of money in period i equals αi.
With regard to the probability of acceptance, we consider settings where the probability
of acceptance decreases with v   100% after each accepted proposal. The probability of
acceptance of the ﬁrst proposal is denoted p. Then, for a given change strategy ξ, the
probability that a change proposed in period i will be accepted is given by:
pi(ξi−1,φi−1) = p, if ξi−1 = (ξ1,...,ξi−1) = (0,...,0), and






We ﬁrst illustrate the eﬀect of κ and p on the expected value of future tax payments
and costs, as well as on the value of the option to change in the case where v = 0. Then,
we investigate the eﬀect of v for given values of κ and p.
Eﬀect of p and κ on initial choice
When v = 0, the probability of acceptance does not change over time and is independent
of earlier decisions, so that:
pi(ξi−1,φi−1) = p, for all i = 2,    ,10.
The following table presents the minimum (over all possible change strategies) of the
expected present value of costs and tax payments when the initial method is SDM and
SY D, respectively, for three diﬀerent values of κ and ﬁve diﬀerent values of p. The
optimal value is indicated in bold. For each value of κ, the third column presents the
expected percentage reduction in tax costs due to the possibility to change.
κ = 0.01 κ = 0.05 κ = 0.2
p SDM SY D SDM SY D SDM SY D
0 14.28 14.10 0% 14.28 14.10 0% 14.28 14.10 0%
0.3 14.01 14.08 0.6% 14.11 14.10 0% 14.28 14.10 0%
0.5 13.95 14.03 1.1% 14.02 14.10 0.6% 14.24 14.10 0%
0.8 13.89 13.93 1.5% 13.95 14.03 1.1% 14.11 14.10 0%
1 13.87 13.88 1.6% 13.92 13.97 1.3% 14.05 14.10 0.4%







































Figure 2: The choice between SDM and SYD as a function of p and κ = k/τ.
Without the possibility to change the depreciation method, i.e. when p = 0, the expected
discounted tax payments equal 14.28 for SDM, and 14.10 for SYD, so that SYD is the
optimal method.
Now, consider p > 0 and κ = 0.01. Then, it can be veriﬁed that the expected
discounted tax costs (tax payments plus cost of proposed changes) are equal for both
methods when p = 0.155. When p < 0.155, the possibility of changing does not aﬀect
the optimal strategy, and the optimal initial choice is SYD. However, when p > 0.155,
the possibility of changing the depreciation method results in a change of strategy. Then,
the ﬁrm optimally starts with SDM, and later on proposes a change to SYD. As soon as
the probability that proposed changes are accepted is higher than 0.5 the ﬁrm expects
to save more than 1% on its tax costs.
When proposing and negotiating a change becomes more costly, the value of the
option to change reduces. The initial choice of the depreciation method as a function
of κ = k/τ, and the probability p of acceptance is illustrated in Figure 2. There is a
sizeable range of values of p and κ where SDM is the optimal initial choice, whereas
when ignoring the possibility of changing, the conclusion would have been that SYD is
the optimal method.
19Eﬀect of v
We now consider the case where the probability of acceptance of a next proposal de-
creases with every accepted proposal, i.e. v > 0. For v > 0, proposing a change not
only brings along costs κ, but also some opportunity costs, since it reduces the oppor-
tunity for strategic behavior in the future. The results for diﬀerent values of v and p
are presented in the following table, for κ = 0.01.
v = 5% v = 10% v = 20% v = 50%
p SDM SY D SDM SY D SDM SY D SDM SY D
0.5 13.95 14.04 13.95 14.05 13.95 14.05 13.96 14.08
1 13.87 13.88 13.87 13.89 13.87 13.90 13.88 13.96
Again, the table presents the minimum over all possible change strategies of the sum
of the expected present value of costs and tax payments, when the initial method is
SDM and SY D, respectively. When SYD is chosen initially, the decrease in probability
of acceptance has signiﬁcant eﬀect, because the optimal change strategy then involves
multiple proposals to change. For example, expected tax costs equal 13.88 when v =
0.05, and increase to 13.96 when v = 0.5. However, in all the above cases, SDM is the
optimal initial choice. The eﬀects of decreasing probabilities is not signiﬁcant in this
case.
6 Conclusion
The paper extends the literature on optimal tax depreciation by incorporating the option
to negotiate a change of depreciation method. It develops a dynamic programming model
to determine the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy with regard to the initial choice of depreciation
method, and whether or not to propose changes in later periods. Since negotiating a
change is costly, and a proposed change might not be accepted by the tax authority, the
optimal choice reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between the costs of the proposal and the expected
reduction in future tax payments.
Eﬃciency in the negotiation process and ﬂexibility of the tax authority with respect
to proposed changes create value for the ﬁrm that can be important in investigating the
proﬁtability of projects. Our analysis indicates that the value of the option to change can
20be signiﬁcant. Furthermore, we show that, in contrast to the static case where changes
are not allowed, a lower discount factor can make the accelerated method less attractive.
Speciﬁcally, if the cost associated with negotiating a change exceeds a threshold value,
a change from straight line depreciation to an accelerated method is optimal only if the
discount factor is suﬃciently high. This occurs because, for the change to be optimal,
the net present value of future tax savings due to the change must outweigh the costs.
A higher discount factor increases this net present value.
21Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. First, it is clear that it is optimal to set ξi,k = 0 in all
decision nodes in which a change of method was implemented in a predecessor node.
Indeed, proposing a change then (i.e. setting ξi,k = 1) weakly increases the expected
cost of proposing changes, without aﬀecting the probability distribution of the resulting
depreciation scheme. Moreover, since changes that are proposed but not accepted do
not aﬀect the probability distribution of the resulting depreciation scheme, it is optimal
to set ξi,k = ξi,1 in every decision node k in which no changes were accepted in prior
nodes.
Second, it is seen immediately that the only depreciation schemes that can occur with
non-zero probability are d(M,k), for k = 1,    ,N, and M ∈ {A,B}.
Now it remains to determine the probability that each of these depreciation schemes
will occur, as well as the probability that a change will be proposed in a given period.
• Depreciation scheme d(M,k) for k < N will result if the following three conditions
are satisﬁed:
– a change is proposed at the beginning of period k + 1, i.e. ξk+1,1 = 1;




– the proposed change in period k + 1 is accepted, which, given that prior
proposals were rejected, occurs with probability p.
• Depreciation scheme d(M,N) results if all proposals to change were rejected, which
occurs with probability (1 − p)
 N
j=2 ξj,1.
This implies that (10) holds true. Next, a change will be proposed in period i iﬀ ξi,1 = 1,
and all prior proposals, if any, were rejected. Therefore, (11) holds true.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose method fM( , ) is used in periods j,    ,i − 1, and
method Mc is used in period j − 1. Then, it follows that
dj+k−1 = fM(k,   N)     D, k = i − j,    ,1,
22where   N = N − j + 1 denotes the remaining depreciable lifetime of the asset at the
beginning of period j, and   D denotes the residual tax base at the beginning of period
j. Then, it holds that:
  D = D +
i−1  
k=j
dk = D +
i−j  
k=1
fM(k,   N)     D.
Therefore, if method M is used in period i, the depreciation charge in that period is
given by:
di = fM(i − j + 1,   N)     D
= qi,j,N   D,
where
qi,j,N =
fM(i − j + 1,N − j + 1)
1 −
 i−j
k=1 fM(k,N − j + 1)
.
Note that it follows from (2) that
qN,·,N =
fM(N − j + 1,N − j + 1)
1 −
 N−j
k=1 fM(k,N − j + 1)
= 1.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6. Follows immediately from Lemma 5, and the fact that for any







Proof of Proposition 7. At any given period i = 2,    ,N, the ﬁrm decides whether
or not to propose a switch of depreciation method, i.e. whether to stick with method
M (i.e. ξi = 0) or to propose a switch to method Mc (i.e. ξi = 1). For both options, the
present value of future tax payments and costs is given by the sum of expected value
of tax payments and costs in period i, and the expected present value of future tax
payments and costs in periods i + 1,    ,N.
23• If ξi = 0, then method M is used in period i, so that the expected tax payments
in period i are given by Tax(i,M,D), and the residual tax base in period i + 1 is
given by (1−qi,M)D. Because no change was proposed this implies that the value
function in period i + 1 is given by Vi+1(M,(1 − qi,M)D,(ξi−1,0),(φi−1,0)).
• If ξi = 1, then costs κ are incurred. With probability pi(ξi−1,φi−1), the pro-
posal will be accepted, so that the expected tax payments in period i are given by
Tax(i,Mc,D), and the residual tax base in period i+1 is given by (1−qi,Mc)D. Be-
cause a change was proposed and accepted, the value function in period i+1 is given
by Vi+1(Mc,(1−qi,Mc)D,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,1)). With probability 1−pi(ξi−1,φi−1), the
proposal is not accepted, so that the expected tax payments in period i are given
by Tax(i,M,D), and the residual tax base in period i+1 is given by (1−qi,M)D.
Because a change was proposed but not accepted, the value function in period
i + 1 is given by Vi+1(M,(1 − qi,M)D,(ξi−1,1),(φi−1,0)).
In period i = 1, both methods are accepted with probability 1, and there is no proposal
to change, so that the expected tax to be paid in period 1 is given by Tax(1,M,D0),
and the value function at date 2 is given by V2(M,(1 − q1,M)D0).






Therefore, since κ ≥ 0 and VN+1( , , , ) = 0, it holds that:
VN(M,D,ξN,φN) = min
   ∞
D









(1 − FN(x))dx, (19)
so that it is never optimal to propose a change in period N.
Proof of Proposition 10. Let i ∈ {1,    ,N − 1}, M ∈ {A,B}, D ∈ [0,D0],
ξi−1 ∈ {0,1}i−2, and φi−1 ∈ {0,1}i−2 be given, and denote Gi(αi) for the expected
beneﬁt of proposing a change in period i, given the current method M, the residual tax
base D, and ξi−1,φi−1. It then follows from Proposition 7 that:
Gi(αi) = −κ + pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,M
c,D)]
+αi   Si+1(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1), (20)
24where Si+1(M,D,ξi−1,φi−1) is as deﬁned in (16). It is optimal to propose a change in
period i iﬀ Gi(αi) > 0. Note that Gi(αi) is linear in αi, and
Gi(0) = −κ + pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,M
c,D)].
We now show that i) and ii) are satisﬁed with   αi ∈ [0,1] deﬁned as follows:




We then distinguish the following three cases:
• If the current method M is the most accelerated method, i.e. qi,M > qi,Mc, then
Gi(0) = −κ + pi
  qi,McD
qi,MD (1 − Fi(x))dx ≤ 0. Therefore,
– If   αi = 1, then Gi(α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [0,1].
– If   αi < 1, then Gi(α) < 0 for all α <   αi and Gi(α) > 0 for all α >   αi.
Since qi,M > qi,Mc, this implies that the most (least) accelerated method is prefer-
able for α <   αi (α >   αi).
• If the current method M is the least accelerated method, i.e. qi,M < qi,Mc, and
κ < pi(ξi−1,φi−1)   [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)], then Gi(0) > 0. Therefore,
– If   αi = 1, then Gi(α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ [0,1].
– If   αi < 1, then Gi(α) > 0 for all α <   αi and Gi(α) < 0 for all α >   αi.
Since qi,M < qi,Mc, this implies that the most (least) accelerated method is prefer-
able for α <   αi (α >   αi).
This concludes the proof of i).
• Finally, if the current method M is the least accelerated method, i.e. qi,M < qi,Mc,
and κ > pi(ξi−1,φi−1) [Tax(i,M,D) − Tax(i,Mc,D)], then Gi(0) < 0. Therefore,
– If   αi = 1, then Gi(α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [0,1].
– If   αi < 1, then Gi(α) < 0 for all α <   αi and Gi(α) > 0 for all α >   αi.
25Since qi,M < qi,Mc, this implies that the least (most) accelerated method is prefer-
able for α <   αi (α >   αi).
This concludes the proof of ii).
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